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Abstract
Intuitively, one can expect that migrant workers have smaller social networks in the
new destination country and by that smaller probability of finding a job through referrals.
However, empirical analysis of the SOEP data from 2002 to 2008 show that 41.21% of migrant
workers and 31.79% of native workers found their current job through referrals. Estimation
results of the panel probit model with random effects show that 7.26% statistically significant
difference of the predicted probabilities of using referrals between migrant and native workers
is not explained by the characteristics of the individuals and firms. In order to explain this
puzzle, this paper presents a search and matching model with heterogeneous worker groups
and several search channels. The firm observes the noisy signal of the productivity, the
nationality and the search channel of the worker to form unbiased expectations about the
true productivity of the worker. The probabilities to be hired for the two worker groups and
different search channels are determined using ex-ante union bargained wage and expectations
of the firm. Calibration results of the model show that even when migrant workers have
smaller size of the social network, they gain more from recommendations, because their
employment chances are initially much lower than employment chances of native workers.
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1 Introduction
A large literature has examined the methods used by workers and firms in the job matching
process both theoretically and empirically. Earlier studies were conducted by sociologists to
emphasize the importance of the social contacts when observing search of the firms and workers
( see Granovetter (1995)). Informal and formal search methods of firms and workers are classified
in the literature in the following way: formal search methods include search through newspaper
advertisements, state and private employment agencies, school and college placement services
and etc, informal methods include search through relatives, friends, acquaintances, referrals
from other employees and etc.
Empirical analysis of the SOEP data from 2002 to 2008 show that 41.21% of migrant workers
found their current job through referrals. While 31.79% of native workers found their current
job through referrals. Estimation results of the panel probit model with random effects show
that a part of the difference can be explained by the control variables including characteristics of
the individuals and firms. But still there is a statistically significant difference of the predicted
probabilities of using referrals between migrant and native workers. Intuitively, one can expect
that migrant workers have smaller social networks in the new destination country and by that
smaller probability finding a job through referrals, but our empirical observation shows that
migrant workers are more likely to find a job through referrals even after introducing controls.
The main goal of this paper is to analyze this paradox and to explain why migrant workers
find jobs through social contacts more often than natives even if they are expected to do it less
frequently than natives.
This paper presents a search and matching model with heterogeneous worker groups and
several search channels. In the model the firm does not observe the real productivity of the
worker, the firm observes the productivity signal of the worker, the group and matching channel
of the worker. There are two groups of workers:natives and immigrants. The workers are matched
to the vacancy through referrals or formal search channels. We assume that compared to the
workers without referral, recommended workers produce different signal to the firm. Furthermore,
we assume that natives’ and migrants’ productivity signals are different either. Phelps (1973)
suggests two cases where two individuals from different groups and with the same signal can be
treated differently. First, when the average productivity of the groups differs, and the signals
are equally informative. Second, when the average productivity of the groups are the same,
while the signals are differently informative. Dustmann et al. (2011) and Galenianos (2013)
assume different uncertainty of signals between the workers matched through referrals and formal
channels, which is like the second case. We rather follow the first case when introducing inequality
between the groups.
The worker is hired if the expected productivity given the productivity signal is higher than
the lower bound of the productivity for the group of the worker. The lower bounds of the
groups are determined based on the ex-ante bargained wage. Calibration of the model gives the
distributions of the productivity signals for the four groups. Thus, we can obtain the probability
of being hired after the match for the four groups. Even though in the model native workers have
more social contacts than migrants, migrant workers are still more likely to find a job through
referrals. Results from the calibration of the model show that the average productivity difference
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between the native and migrant workers is positive. Moreover, average productivity difference
between the workers with and without referrals is also positive. The probability that the native
workers are hired after they are matched with the firm through referrals is approximately 2.15
times more than the probability for the native workers matched through formal channels. The
probability that the migrant workers are hired after they are matched with the firm through
referrals is 4.06 times more than the probability for the migrant workers matched through formal
channels. So the gain from finding job through referrals for the migrants is higher than the gain
for the natives.
Different models were developed and empirical studies were conducted to show the effect of
search methods of firms and workers on the labour market outcomes. Let us first discuss the
models and the main findings of the literature, particularly, the model predictions and empirical
results on the effects of search methods on the wage and probability to be hired. Most of
the studies conducted agree that using informal search methods increases the probability to be
hired, but the model predictions and empirical results on wage effect are mixed: some authors
find positive wage effect (see Montgomery (1991), Dustmann et al. (2011), Galenianos (2013)),
while others find the effect to be negative (Pistaferri (1999), Bentolila et al. (2010)).
Social contacts tend to occur among workers with similar characteristics. Moreover, a worker
will refer only well-qualified applicants, since his reputation is at stake. Following these argu-
ments, Montgomery (1991) constructs an adverse-selection model with two time periods, where
employer observes the type of a worker and conditional on the observed type of the current worker
makes a wage offer for the next period. Thus employers relying on referrals from high ability
workers try to mitigate the adverse-selection problem, assuming that the current high ability
worker will refer to an own type high ability worker. Dustmann et al. (2011) build their model
on the Jovanovic (1979, 1984) job matching model, and they extend the model by distinguishing
between informal and formal search methods. The key difference between the two search meth-
ods according to them is that the worker’s match-specific productivity is more uncertain when
using formal methods, rather than informal methods. Overall, based on their assumptions both
models predict positive effect of using informal search methods on the match quality between
firms and workers.
While Bentolila et al. (2010) propose a model, according to which matching through informal
channels produces mismatch between the worker’s productivity and occupation. In their model
they assume that every worker has productive advantage in exactly one occupation and the
social contacts of the worker are all employed in same occupation, which is random. So there is
a positive probability that the use of informal methods by the worker may cause mismatch and
thus lower quality matches between workers and firms.
Unlike the model predictions on the wages, the predictions on the probability to be hired are
similar for most of the above mentioned models. Dustmann et al. (2011) do not directly explore
the probability to be hired when using different search channels. While Galenianos (2013) uses
similar learning model and predicts positive effect of using referrals on the probability to be
hired. The model by Montgomery (1991) also predicts positive effect of using referrals on the
probability to be hired. The positive effect can be explained by the expectations of the firm,
that most likely high ability worker will refer to a worker of his/her own type. According to the
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favoritism explanation, referred workers are more likely to be hired due to the influence by the
referee. Although Bentolila et al. (2010) find mismatch between worker’s most productive and
actual occupation, they find positive effect on probability to obtain the job when using referrals.
Besides theoretical studies of the effect of using referrals on the match quality there are
empirical observations in the literature. Brown, Setren and Topa (2014) exploit panel dataset on
a single U.S corporation and empirically check the model predictions in the literature. Using this
dataset enables them to control for various individual and job specific characteristics, but as the
data is on a single firm, the results can hardly be representative for the entire economy. They
obtain 2.4% positive effect of using referrals on probability to be hired; moreover, conditional
on being interviewed the positive effect is 13.9%. Dawid and Gemkow (2013) employ a closed
agent-based macroeconomic simulation model to study how social networks contribute to wage
inequality. They find that due to the referral hiring workers with high specific skills are matched
to the high productive firms. Therefore, the workers who find their job through referrals get on
average higher wages than those who find job through other channels.
Cappellari and Tatsiramos (2013) draw attention to the findings of Calvo-Armengol and
Jackson (2004) that the key factor for understanding the effectiveness of the social contacts is
employment status of the contacts. Following this idea instead of using proxies of network size,
they use British Household Panel Survey, which provides the employment status of the closest
three friends, which they define as the network quality measure. They estimate the effect of
the network quality on the job finding probability using three estimation methods to eliminate
potential bias and obtained positive relationship between the number of employed friends and job
finding probability. Cappellari and Tatsiramos (2013) propose an alternative explanation to this
result, arguing that the higher network quality of network can make pressure to non-employed
member to search more actively leading to higher job finding rate.
Drever and Hoffmeister (2008) use the SOEP data and find that nearly half of all the migrants
find their job through networks. In addition, they find that when the migrants find the job
through social networks the perceived improvement of working conditions is the same as if they
find the job through formal channels. Moreover, the improvement of working conditions does
not depend on the ethnic makeup of the migrant’s network. While Lancee (2016) finds that for
migrants using referrals leads to higher earnings than using formal search channels only in case
of the bridging social capital, but the result holds only for high educated migrants with good
German language proficiency. Eisnecker and Schacht (2016) observe the length of time it took
to find the first job for migrants and find that the migrants, which use informal search channels
find the job faster than the migrants which search through formal channels. These studies report
the effect of using referrals on the labour market outcomes. But this study rather aims to find
the reason of the different frequency of using referrals between native and migrant workers.
The study proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the data used, the descriptive statistics
and discusses the empirical approach and estimation results; section 3 explains the search and
matching model with heterogeneous worker groups and several search channels; section 4 presents
the results from the calibration of the model; section 5 concludes.
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2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Data
This subsection describes the data used and defines the dependent and independent variables.
This study uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel(SOEP) for the empirical analysis.
The German Socio-Economic Panel every year covers nearly 11,000 households, and about 30,000
individuals. SOEP is a longitudinal study of households and individuals. Among a wide range
of questions regarding personal characteristics and employment data respondents are asked how
they found their current job. Information about the way the respondents found their current job
makes SOEP data suitable for this study. Our sample covers data on 6769 employed individuals
from SOEP 2002-2008.
Individuals are considered to have found job through referrals if they responded that they
found out about their current job through friends or relatives. Individuals are considered to have
found job through formal channels in case they responded that they found out about their current
job through other channels, for example, through the federal employment office, an advertisement
in the internet or in the newspaper, through a job-center(ARGE) and etc. The corresponding
dummy variable REFit takes value 1, if the ith person found out about the job through referrals
at time t, and it takes value 0, if the ith person found out about the job through formal channels
at time t. Another categorical variable TOJCHit indicates which kind of job change finding the
current job was. TOJCHit has 5 categories: first job, job after break, job with new employer,
company taken over, changed job at the same firm. FSIZEit is another categorical variable,
which shows the size of the firm the ith individual is employed at time t. It has 6 categories: less
than 5 employees, 5 to 19, 20 to 99, 100 to 199, 200 to 1999, and 2000 and more employees.
One of the most important variables is the variable MIGit indicating the nationality of
individuals. We define an individual to be migrant if the person has foreign citizenship or got
German citizenship at a later date than birth. And the German or native are individuals who
got German citizenship at their birth. The variable MIGit equals to 1 if the ith individual is
migrant at time t, and it is equal to 0 if the ith individual is German at time t. As a measure
of individual’s education we use the amount of education or training in years computed by the
SOEP.1 The corresponding variable EDUit shows the ith individual’s computed education or
training in years at time t. The values of EDUit range from 7 to 18. AGEit shows the ith
individual’s age at time t. In our analysis we consider 18 to 65 year old individuals. 2
To control for the occupational status we used the Standard International Socio-Economic
Index of Occupational Status developed by Ganzeboom et al. (1992). Based on information
about individual’s income, education, and occupation, ISEI index reflects individual’s socio-
economic status. ISEIit equals to the ith individual’s ISEI value at time t and ranges from 16
to 90.
1for detailed description see Helberger (1988) and Schwarze (1991).
2AGEit is equal to the difference of the year of survey minus year of the individual’s birth.
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2.2 Descriptive Statistics
In this subsection we discuss the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimations.
REFit is the main variable of our interest. According to the descriptive statistics presented in
the Table 2, 32.9% of observed respondents replied, that they found their current job through
referrals. On the one hand, according to the Table 1, there is significant 9.42% difference between
the native and migrant individuals which found the current job through referrals . On the other
hand, 44.40% of foreign citizens found the current job through referrals, compared to 32.04%
for citizens of Germany. So in this case the difference is 12.36%, which shows that for the
migrants with German citizenship the percentage is closer to the one for natives, compared to
the percentage for migrants with foreign citizenship. This might possibly be explained by some
sort of assimilation of migrants with German citizenship.
Citizenship\Migration status Found job through referrals
Foreign Citizens 44.40%
Citizens of Germany 32.04%
Migrants 41.21%
Natives 31.79%
Table 1: Percentage of individuals found the current job through referrals by
citizenship\migration status.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimations. Besides the
statistics about the overall sample observed, Table 2 includes descriptive statistics separately for
the natives and the migrants, to better understand the differences between the two groups.
Variable Natives Migrants Overall
EDUit 12.69 11.35 12.53
AGEit 34.364 34.358 34.36
AGE2it 1300.56 1282.35 1282.35
REFit 0.318 0.412 0.329
MIGit - - 0.1217
FSIZEit % % %
less than 5 11.43 13.00 11.62
5 to 19 22.52 23.70 22.67
20 to 99 21.01 23.36 21.29
100 to 199 8.83 8.41 8.78
200 to 1999 17.26 16.57 17.18
2000 and more 18.95 14.95 18.46
TOJCHit % % %
first job 12.08 11.05 11.95
job after break 32.92 40.10 33.80
job with new employer 42.86 42.14 42.77
company taken over 2.58 2.55 2.57
changed job same firm 9.56 4.16 8.90
ISEIit 44.83 38.38 44.04
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
On average migrants have 11.35 years of education, which is 1.34 years less compared to
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the average education of natives. Moreover, migrants are relatively younger and are employed in
smaller firms compared to natives. When we look at the first three categories of FSIZEit, we can
see that proportion of migrants employed in each of the categories is higher than the proportion
of natives employed at the same category. On the contrary, higher proportion of natives is
employed in each of the last three categories of FSIZEit in comparison to the proportion of
migrants employed at the same category. When it comes to the type of job change, except from
the category "job after break" in all the other categories proportion of migrants is lower. In
the case of "job after break" and "changed job same firm," the differences are relatively higher.
In the former case the proportion is higher for the migrants, in the latter case, for the natives.
Furthermore, average ISEIit is higher for the natives, so compared to migrants, natives have
higher average occupational status. To sum up, in our sample migrants are relatively younger,
with lower average years of education,with lower average ISEI index and they are employed at
smaller-size firms.
2.3 Empirical Approach
Since the dependent variable REFit = 1 is binary, we use binary choice regression models in
empirical estimations. Moreover, since the data used is longitudinal, we compare the results
obtained by using pooled probit regressions and panel probit regressions with random effects.
Among different regression models these two regression models were chosen and we discuss the
reasons in this subsection. Let us first discuss fixed effects logit and probit models for panel
data. When number of the time periods T is fixed, estimation of the fixed effects model en-
counters an incidental parameters problem. As a result, estimators of the constant terms are
not consistent. And since the maximum-likelihood estimator (MLE) of coefficients is a func-
tion of the estimators of the constant terms, MLE of the coefficients is inconsistent either.(see
Neyman and Scott(1948) and Lancaster (2000).) However, following Rasch (1960) and Ander-
sen (1970), Chamberlain (1980) proposes a consistent conditional maximum likelihood estimator
(CMLE) given that the conditional likelihood function satisfies regularity conditions. These reg-
ularity conditions impose mild restrictions on the incidental parameters discussed in Andersen
(1970),(1971). Chamberlain (1980) demonstrates that conditional on sufficient statistics for the
incidental parameters, likelihood function is free of the incidental parameters. In the logit model,
sum of the individual dependent variable’s value over time is a minimal sufficient statistic for
the individual constant term. Thus, the CMLE is computationally convenient estimator for the
fixed effects logit model, but it is not the case for the fixed effects probit model. In the fixed
effects probit model the incidental parameters can not be removed from the conditional likelihood
function, because there are no sufficient statistics available for the probit model. Hence, in case
of fixed effects the logit model is more preferable than the probit model.
However, conditional ML estimation of fixed effects logit model is not efficient for our estima-
tions for the following reasons. First, out of 9670 observations only 2376 are used in the CMLE
estimations, because if the individual dependent variable does not change over time, the condi-
tional probability of the observation contributes nothing to the conditional likelihood function.
Second, the marginal effects can not be estimated with the coefficients estimated by CMLE,
because fixed effects are not estimated.
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Unlike the case of the fixed effects models, for the analysis of the random effects, the probit
model is more preferable than the logit model. Since in the logit model errors are assumed to
have a logistic distribution, logit model uses multivariate logistic distribution. The disadvantage
of the multivariate logistic distribution is that the correlations are all constrained to be 0.5. Thus
the probit model, which is based on the multivariate normal distribution, is more flexible. (see
Johnson and Kotz (1972), Maddala (1987).)
Compared to the binary choice fixed effects model, disadvantage of the binary choice random
effects models is that these models do not allow for a correlation between the individual effects
and the explanatory variables. Random effects probit model produces a consistent estimator
of coefficients under the certain very strong assumptions about the heterogeneity. (see Greene
(2007), section 23.5.) Random effects model can be extended to binary choice setting by the
method specified by Butler and Moffitt (1982). Then, log likelihood can be approximated using
a Gauss-Hermite quadrature technique. Estimation of the random effects probit model was
conducted using the statistical program Stata, which follows adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature
method of Naylor and Smith (1982) to approximate the panel-level likelihood. 3
We compare the estimation results of the random effects probit model to the results obtained
using pooled probit model. Our observations show that there is not statistically significant
difference between using pooled logit or pooled probit model, so we choose to use a pooled probit
model since the results are then better comparable to the results obtained from the estimation
of random effects probit model. 4
2.4 Estimation Results
First, we compare the panel probit estimator to the pooled probit estimator. A likelihood-ratio
test is conducted to check if the panel estimator is different from the pooled estimator. The test
suggests that the panel-level variance component is significantly more than zero, which implies
that the panel probit model with random effects is statistically more preferable than the pooled
probit model. Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients and marginal effects at mean values of
the variables both for the pooled probit model and panel probit model with random effects. The
estimated coefficients and marginal effects of the two models are not very different from each
other. This can be explained by the fact, that approximately only 1.4 observations are available
on average per individual. However, estimation results of the panel probit RE will be used for
the further analysis.
The positive coefficient of the variableMIGit shows that migrants are more likely to be hired
through referrals after the controls. After the controls the difference of 9.42% decreases to 6.3%
when we compare a migrant with a native worker both with the same average characteristics.
Negative coefficients of variables EDUit and AGEit show that individuals with higher age and
more education are less likely to find the current job through referrals. Moreover, individuals
occupied in the firms with more employees are less likely to find job through referrals. The
probability of finding job through referrals of a migrant with average characteristics ranges from
3See details at the Stata 13 Base Reference Manual.
4Furthermore, there are other alternative estimation techniques proposed in the literature. But estimators from
both the pooled probit model and random effects probit model give consistent estimators. Moreover, estimating
these two models is computationally convenient and fits better to the data particularly we have.
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43.4% for the firm size category "less than 5" to 27.5% for the firm size category "2000 and
more." For a native with average characteristics the corresponding probabilities are 36.5% and
21.9% respectively.
Pooled probit Pooled probit Panel probit RE Panel probit RE
Variable Coefficient Marginal effects Coefficient Marginal effects
Const 0.741*** 0.802***
(0.155) (0.168)
EDUit -0.019*** -0.0066*** -0.020*** -0.0069***
(0.007) (0.0024) (0.007) (0.0025)
AGEit -0.026*** -0.0014** -0.028*** -0.0015*
(0.009) (0.0006) (0.010) (0.0006)
AGE2it 0.00032** 0.00035**
(0.00012) (0.00013)
MIGit 0.172*** 0.062*** 0.178*** 0.063***
(0.043) (0.016) (0.046) (0.017)
FSIZEit
5 to 19 -0.128*** -0.048*** -0.141*** -0.052***
(0.048) (0.018) (0.051) (0.019)
20 to 99 -0.223*** -0.081*** -0.243*** -0.088***
(0.049) (0.018) (0.053) (0.019)
100 to 199 -0.236*** -0.086*** -0.252*** -0.091***
(0.060) (0.022) (0.065) (0.023)
200 to 1999 -0.335*** -0.120*** -0.364*** -0.127***
(0.053) (0.019) (0.057) (0.020)
2000 and more -0.396*** -0.139*** -0.430*** -0.148***
(0.054) (0.019) (0.058) (0.020)
TOJCHit
job after break -0.062 -0.022 -0.059 -0.020
(0.052) (0.019) (0.056) (0.020)
job with new employer 0.118** 0.043** 0.136** 0.049**
(0.050) (0.018) (0.054) (0.019)
company taken over -0.732*** -0.207*** -0.793*** -0.210***
(0.110) (0.025) (0.121) (0.026)
changed job same firm -0.904*** -0.237*** -0.977*** -0.238***
(0.083) (0.021) (0.092) (0.021)
ISEIit -0.0052*** -0.0018*** -0.0058*** -0.0020***
(0.0011) (0.00038) (0.0012) (0.00039)
Observations 9670 9670 9670 9670
McFadden′s R2 0.0574 0.0599
Significance level: * if p < 0.10, ** if p < 0.05, *** if p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parantheses.
Table 3: Estimated coefficients and marginal effects.
TOJCHit is yet another significant variable. The probability of finding job through referrals
of an individual with average characteristics is 30.7% when the current job of the individual is
the first job. The probability is not significantly different when the job is a job after break. The
corresponding probability equals to 28.7%. But in case of job with new employer the probability
is significantly different and equals to 35.7%. Unlike the three cases mentioned above, the
probability is relatively low in the cases of company taken over and changed job same firm. In
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the former case the probability is 9.7%, in the latter case it is 6.9%. And finally, an individual
with average characteristics is less likely to find job through referrals if the individual’s ISEIit
is higher.
To sum up, a part of the different frequency of finding job through referrals between natives
and immigrants can be explained by individual characteristics and other controls. However, there
are different predicted probabilities which may be used for the numerical analysis. Table 4 shows
different predicted probabilities using pooled probit model and panel probit RE.
Predicted probabilities
Pooled probit Panel probit RE
Migrants at means 0.354 0.339
Natives at means 0.292 0.276
Average migrant 0.393 0.380
Average native 0.288 0.271
Average of migrants 0.413 0.403
Average of natives 0.318 0.306
All migrants 0.382 0.371
All natives 0.322 0.310
Average migrant* 0.363 0.348
Average native* 0.291 0.275
Table 4: Predicted probabilities
"Migrants/natives at means" are two otherwise-average individuals’ predicted probabilities
of using referrals. "Average migrant/native" is the predicted probability of using referrals for
an individual with average migrant/native features. "Average of migrants/natives" is the av-
erage of the predicted probabilities of using referrals for migrants/natives. In case of the "all
migrants/natives" all observations are treated as if they are all migrant/native regardless of
their migration status. Then the probabilities are predicted using the features of all obser-
vations(treating them as migrant/native). The resulting averages are "all migrants/natives."
"Average migrant*/native*" are the predicted probabilities of a migrant/native with average
education and age of migrants/natives keeping other variables at the overall means. 5 Since in
the model migrants and natives have different average productivity, we will use the predicted
probabilities of average migrant*/native* in the numerical example. We propose a model and
bring a numerical example, where we try to find the possible reason for the 7.26% difference
between "average migrant*" and "average native*."
3 Model
We develop a search and matching model with heterogeneous worker groups and several search
channels. The model is built on the "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory" of Pissarides (2000).
A continuum of risk neutral workers and firms live forever and discount future at a common
discount rate r. Firms are homogeneous, and there is free entry of new vacancy with the flow
cost c. In this setting the firm does not observe real productivity of the applicant, instead the
firm observes a noisy signal of the productivity, as well as the nationality of the applicant. The
5All the probabilities are predicted assuming that the random effects are equal to 0.
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firm also knows whether the applicant found the vacancy through referrals or through formal
channels.
3.1 Productivity
There are two groups of workers, j = n- natives and j = i- migrants. The true productivity of
workers p is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2.  is a zero-mean error that is
normally distributed with variance σ2 . This productivity is not observable by the firm.
p ∼ N(µ, σ2),  ∼ N(0, σ2 ) (1)
Unemployed workers are identical within their ethnic group j. Once the worker is matched
with the firm, there is a match-specific productivity draw p. There are two search channels in
the model: formal and informal (referrals). In the model the firm does not observe the real
productivity of the worker, the firm observes the productivity signal of the worker, the group
and matching channel of the worker. In the empirical part we find that in our sample on average
migrants have less education. Moreover, Kaas and Manger (2012) conduct a field experiment
on the ethnic discrimination in Germany’s labour market and conclude that there might be
statistical discrimination in hiring in Germany’s labour market. So, we assume that natives’
and migrants’ productivity signals are different, and the difference equals to d. Thus, the the
productivity draw after being matched for the native workers pn and for the migrant workers pi
are respectively:
pn ∼ N(µ, σ2), pi ∼ N(µ− d, σ2) (2)
Kugler (2003) finds that firms using informal methods in hiring, lower their monitoring cost,
because referees exert peer pressure on the referred workers. This means that referrals raise the
productivity of the recommended workers. This enables the firms to use referrals and pay lower
efficiency wages. In equilibrium, the matching process generates segmentation in the labour
market, where well-connected workers are matched through referrals to high paying jobs, while
less-connected workers are matched through formal channels to lower paid jobs. So, the recom-
mended workers are more productive compared to the workers matched through formal channels.
Thus, we assume that compared to the workers without referral workers with referral produce
different signal to the firm. On average the difference between the productivity signals is s.
Based on the findings in the literature related to the job search through social networks and
hiring discrimination we expect both s and d to be positive. And indeed we find them to be
positive in the calibration results. So the productivity signal of the native worker without referral
p′nw is:
p′nw = p+ , p
′
nw ∼ N(µ, σ2 + σ2 ) (3)
Productivity signal of the native worker with referral p′nc is:
p′nc = p+ s+ , p
′
nc ∼ N(µ+ s, σ2 + σ2 ) (4)
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Productivity signal of the migrant worker without referral p′iw is:
p′iw = p− d+ , p′iw ∼ N(µ− d, σ2 + σ2 ) (5)
Productivity signal of the migrant worker with referral p′ic is:
p′ic = p− d+ s+ , p′ic ∼ N(µ− d+ s, σ2 + σ2 ) (6)
The firm forms unbiased expectations on the real productivity of applicants given the group of
the worker and the noisy productivity signal. Since the true productivity of the workers and
the productivity signals are jointly normally distributed, following DeGroot (2005) expected
productivity given the productivity signal for the four groups can be written as follows. The
expected productivity given the productivity signal of the native worker without referral:
E(p|p′nw) = µ+
σ2
σ2 + σ2
(p′nw − µ) (7)
The expected productivity given the productivity signal of the native worker with referral:
E(p|p′nc) = µ+ s+
σ2
σ2 + σ2
(p′nc − µ− s) (8)
The expected productivity given the productivity signal of the migrant worker without referral:
E(p|p′iw) = µ− d+
σ2
σ2 + σ2
(p′iw − µ+ d) (9)
The expected productivity given the productivity signal of the migrant worker with referral:
E(p|p′nc) = µ− d+ s+
σ2
σ2 + σ2
(p′nc − µ+ d− s) (10)
3.2 Matching function
Since the workers are matched to the firm through formal channels and through referrals, the
matching functions for the two cases are different. We assume that the matching functions for
native and migrant workers mfj(uj , v) have Cobb-Douglas form in case of the matching through
formal channels.
mfn(un, v) = λ0u
η
nv
1−η,mfi(ui, v) = λ0u
η
i v
1−η (11)
Where uj is the unemployment rate of the group j, v is the vacancy rate, and η is the elasticity
with respect to the unemployment in the matching function. λfn and λfi are the job finding
rates in the formal market for natives and immigrants repectively:
λfn =
λ0v
(1−η)
u
(1−η)
n
, λfi =
λ0v
(1−η)
u
(1−η)
i
(12)
Where λ0 is the total factor productivity of the matching function, un and ui are the number of
unemployed natives and migrants respectively. Job filling rates in the formal market for natives
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qn and immigrants qi:
qn =
λ0u
η
n
vη
, qi =
λ0u
η
i
vη
(13)
Next, we explain the mechanism of referral hiring. According to Montgomery (1991) social
networks are often characterised by the inbreeding bias (homophily). This means that social
links are often formed between similar workers. Following this idea we expect that native workers
will have a large fraction of other native workers in their social network. Let this proportion be
denoted by γn. This also means that they have (1−γn) contacts with immigrant workers. Similar,
let γi denote the fraction of immigrant workers in the social network of immigrant workers. Then
the fraction of native workers in the social network of immigrant workers is (1− γi).
Following Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2015), matching functions in case of matching through
referrals for natives, mn can be written as:
mn = va((f − un)[1− (1− un
f
)γnhn(1− ui
1− f )
(1−γn)hn ]
γn
un
f
γn
un
f + (1− γn) ui1−f
+ (1− f − ui)[1− (1− ui
1− f )
γihi(1− un
f
)(1−γi)hi ]
(1− γi)unf
γi
ui
1−f + (1− γi)unf
(14)
Where a is the exogenous rate at which a vacancy arrives to a worker per unit time. ( see
Cahuc and Fontaine (2009).) f is the fraction of natives, 1 − f is the fraction of migrants. γn
is the level of homophily between the social contacts of a native worker. The corresponding
rate of homophily of a migrant worker is γi. hn is the number of social contacts of natives, and
the number of social contacts of migrants is hi. In this setup the match between the firm and
a native worker happens in the following way. The firm opens v vacancies, and va vacancies
arrive to the workers of the firm. Information about these vacancies can be transmitted to an
unemployed native both by an employed native and by an employed migrant worker. va(f −un)
vacancies arrive to an employed native worker. (1− unf )γnhn is the probability that all the native
contacts of the native worker are employed. (1 − ui1−f )(1−γn)hn is the probability that all the
migrant contacts of the native worker are employed. So [1− (1− ui1−f )γihi(1− unf )(1−γi)hi ] is the
probability that the employed native worker has at least one unemployed contact. The employed
native worker transmits the information to a random unemployed contact, which is unemployed
native with probability
γn
un
f
γn
un
f + (1− γn) ui1−f
. With probability (1 − f − ui) the va vacancies
arrive to an employed migrant worker. The probability that the employed migrant worker has
at least one unemployed contact is [1 − (1 − ui1−f )γihi(1 − unf )(1−γi)hi ]. The employed migrant
worker transmits the information to a random unemployed contact, which is unemployed native
with probability
(1− γn) ui(1−f)
γn
un
f + (1− γn) ui1−f
.
Following the same intuition and the vacancy information transmission mechanism described
above the matching function in case of matching through referrals for migrants, mi can be written
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as:
mi = va((1− f − ui)[1− (1− ui
1− f )
γihi(1− un
f
)(1−γi)hi ]
γi
ui
1−f
γi
ui
1−f + (1− γi)unf
+ (f − un)[1− (1− un
f
)γnhn(1− ui
1− f )
(1−γn)hn ]
(1− γn) ui(1−f)
γn
un
f + (1− γn) ui1−f
(15)
Job finding rate in case of finding job through referrals is λnc for natives and λic for migrants:
λnc =
mn
un
, λic =
mi
ui
(16)
3.3 Bellman equations
In the model the firm does not observe the real productivity of the workers, but it observes the
group of the worker and the distribution of the productivity signal of that group. As the wages
are set by an ex-ante bargaining between the union and the firm, the wage is set the same for
all workers and does not depend on the productivity of an individual worker. So if we assume
that the wage w is more than the unemployment benefit b,6 then the Bellman equation for the
present discounted value of an employed native worker Wn can be written as:
rWn = w − δ(Wn − Un) or Wn − Un = w − rUn
(r + δ)
(17)
Where δ is the exogenous job destruction rate, and Un is the present discounted value of unem-
ployed native workers. So all employed workers earn a wage w; at the exogenous rate δ they lose
their job and become unemployed. Hence the expected capital loss from losing a job for a native
worker is δ(Wn − Un).
Bellman equation for the present discounted value of an employed migrant worker Wi can be
written as:
rWi = w − δ(Wi − Ui) or Wi − Ui = w − rUi
(r + δ)
(18)
Where Ui is the present discounted value of unemployed migrant workers. Similar to native
workers, migrant workers also earn a wage w and at the exogenous rate δ they lose their job
and become unemployed. But the expected capital loss from losing a job for a migrant worker is
δ(Wi − Ui).
Bellman equation for the present discounted value of unemployed native workers:
rUn = b+ λfn
∫ ∞
p′0nw
[Wn − Un]dΦnw(p′nw) + λnc
∫ ∞
p′0nc
[Wn − Un]dΦnc(p′nc) (19)
The unemployed native worker gets unemployment benefit b, and expects to move into em-
ployment through formal channels at job finding rate λfn. The unemployed native worker also
expects to move into employment through referrals at rate λnc. The expected capital gain of
the unemployed native worker from finding a job through formal channels is λfn
∫∞
p′0nw
[Wn −
Un]dΦnw(p
′
nw), and the expected capital gain of the unemployed native worker from finding a
6w > b condition is necessary to ensure that w−rUn
(r+δ)
> 0
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job through referrals is λnc
∫∞
p′0nc
[Wn − Un]dΦnc(p′nc). So the net expected capital gain of the
unemployed native worker from finding a job is the sum of these two expressions. Note that after
matching with the firm through formal channels only those unemployed native workers are hired
whose productivity signal is higher than the lower bound of the productivity signal p′0nw. While
after matching with the firm through referrals only those unemployed native workers are hired
whose productivity signal is higher than the lower bound of the productivity signal p′0nc.
Bellman equation for the present discounted value of unemployed migrant workers:
rUi = b+ λfi
∫ ∞
p′0iw
[Wi − Ui]dΦiw(p′iw) + λic
∫ ∞
p′0ic
[Wi − Ui]dΦic(p′ic) (20)
The unemployed migrant worker also gets unemployment benefit b, and expects to move into
employment through formal channels at job finding rate λfi. So the expected capital gain of
the unemployed migrant worker from finding a job through formal channels is λfi
∫∞
p′0iw
[Wi −
Ui]dΦiw(p
′
iw). While the unemployed migrant worker expects to move into employment through
referrals at rate λic. Then the expected capital gain of the unemployed native worker from finding
a job through referrals is λic
∫∞
p′0ic
[Wi − Ui]dΦic(p′ic).
Equation (19) and (20) can be simplified and rewritten as follows:
rUn = b+ (λfnP (p
′
nw > p
′
0nw) + λncP (p
′
nc > p
′
0nc))
w − rUn
r + δ
(21)
rUi = b+ (λfiP (p
′
iw > p
′
0iw) + λicP (p
′
ic > p
′
0ic))
w − rUi
r + δ
(22)
Where we assume that unemployed workers do not observe their own productivity. Thus Un
and Ui do not depend on the individual productivity of the unemployed worker. So the Wn−Un
andWi−Ui can be taken out of the integrals and substituted by the right-hand sides (henceforth
RHS) of the second parts of the equations (17) and (18) respectively.
The unemployment rates of native and migrant workers are given by the differences between
the flows into and out of the unemployment. f − un employed native workers lose their job
at rate δ, so the flow into the unemployment of the native workers is δ(f − un). While un
unemployed native workers find a job through formal channels at job finding rate λfn. With
probability P (p′nw > p′0nw) they have productivity signal higher than p′0nw, and they move to
the employment. So the flow out of the unemployment for the native workers through the
formal channels is λfnP (p′nw > p′0nw)un. The un unemployed native workers may also find a
job through referrals at job finding rate λnc. With probability P (p′nc > p′0nc) they have higher
productivity signal than p′0nc, and they move to the employment. Thus, the total outflow from
the unemployment for the native workers is λfnP (p′nw > p′0nw)un +λncP (p′nc > p′0nc)un. Similar
to the employed native workers, 1 − f − ui employed migrant workers lose their job at rate δ,
so the flow into the unemployment for the migrant workers is δ(1 − f − ui). ui unemployed
migrant workers find a job through formal channels at job finding rate λfi. With probability
P (p′iw > p
′
0iw) they have higher productivity signal than p
′
0iw, and they move to the employment.
So the flow out of the unemployment for the migrant workers through the formal channels is
λfiP (p
′
iw > p
′
0iw)ui. The ui unemployed migrant workers may also find a job through referrals
at job finding rate λic. With probability P (p′ic > p
′
0ic) they have higher productivity signal than
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p′0ic, and they move to the employment. Thus, the total outflow from the unemployment for
the migrant workers is λfiP (p′iw > p
′
0iw)ui + λicP (p
′
ic > p
′
0ic)ui. Steady state equations for the
unemployment rates of natives and migrants can be described by the following equations:
u˙n = δ(f − un)− λfnP (p′nw > p′0nw)un − λncP (p′nc > p′0nc)un = 0 (23)
u˙i = δ(1− f − ui)− λfiP (p′iw > p′0iw)ui − λicP (p′ic > p′0ic)ui = 0 (24)
At the steady state the flow into the unemployment equals to the flow out of the unemployment:
δ(f − un)
un
= λfnP (p
′
nw > p
′
0nw) + λncP (p
′
nc > p
′
0nc) (25)
δ(1− f − ui)
ui
= λfiP (p
′
iw > p
′
0iw) + λicP (p
′
ic > p
′
0ic) (26)
The expression on the RHS of the equation (25) appears in the equation (21) either. The same
holds for the equations (26) and (22). If we substitute the corresponding expressions in the
equations (21) and (22) with the LHS of the equations (25)and (26) we can obtain the following
expressions for the present discounted value of unemployed native and migrant workers:
Un =
b(r + δ) + w δ(f−un)un
r(r + δ + δ(f−un)un )
(27)
Ui =
b(r + δ) + w( δ(1−f−ui)ui )
r(r + δ + δ(1−f−ui)ui )
(28)
Bellman equation for the present discounted value of the firm’s expected profit from a filled
job can be written as:
rE[J(p|p′)] = E(p|p′)− w − δ(E[J(p|p′)]− V ) (29)
Where E[J(p|p′)] is the present discounted value of the firm’s expected profit from a filled
job given the productivity signal of the worker. V is the present discounted value of the firm’s
expected profit from an open vacancy. The equation (28) can be rewritten so that we get the
net return of the job to the firm in the LHS of the equation:
E[J(p|p′)]− V = E(p|p
′)− w − rV
r + δ
(30)
Under the Free Entry condition the present discounted value of the firm’s expected profit from
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an open vacancy equals to 0:
rV = −c+ mn
v
∫ ∞
p′0nc
[Ep(J(p|p′nc))− V ]dΦnc(p′nc) + qn
∫ ∞
p′0nw
[Ep(J(p|p′nw))− V ]dΦnw(p′nw)
+
mi
v
∫ ∞
p′0ic
[Ep(J(p|p′ic))− V ]dΦic(p′ic) + qi
∫ ∞
p′0iw
[Ep(J(p|p′iw))− V ]dΦiw(p′iw) = 0 (31)
Where the flow cost of the vacancy is c. The expected return of the vacancy to the firm consists
of four parts, because the are two different groups of workers matched to the firm through two
different channels. The expected return of the vacancy to the firm is the sum of the expected
returns from the groups. The expected return from a group equals to the product of the job
filling rate of the group and the expected net return of the job if the job is filled by a worker of
that group. Note that the firm hires a worker from a particular group only if the productivity
signal of the worker is higher than the lower bound of the productivity signal for the group. Thus
the firm makes sure that the net return of the job to the firm is positive when the job is filled
by a worker from that group. Since the wage is determined ex-ante, the lower bound for the
groups are so that the E(p|p′0)−w = 0, i.e. the RHS of the equation (30) is zero. The expected
productivity of the worker equals to the predetermined wage given the worker’s productivity
signal equals to lower bound of the productivity signal p′0, i.e. E(p|p′0) = w. Thus we can obtain
the lower bounds of the productivity signal for the four groups by rewriting the equations (6) to
(9) for the expected productivity at the lower bounds and equalizing them to the wage:
E(p|p′0nw) = µ+
σ2
σ2 + σ2
(p′0nw − µ) = w, p′0nw = (w − µ)
σ2 + σ2
σ2
+ µ (32)
E(p|p′0nc) = µ+ s+
σ2
σ2 + σ2
(p′0nc − µ− s) = w, p′0nc = (w − µ− s)
σ2 + σ2
σ2
+ µ+ s (33)
E(p|p′0iw) = µ− d+
σ2
σ2 + σ2
(p′0iw − µ+ d) = w, p′0iw = (w − µ+ d)
σ2 + σ2
σ2
+ µ− d (34)
E(p|p′0ic) = µ−d+s+
σ2
σ2 + σ2
(p′0ic−µ+d−s) = w, p′0ic = (w−µ+d−s)
σ2 + σ2
σ2
+µ−d+s (35)
Finally, the fraction of native workers who found their job through referrals:
frn =
λncP (p
′
nc > p
′
0nc)
λfnP (p′nw > p′0nw) + λncP (p′nc > p′0nc)
(36)
The fraction of migrant workers who found their job through referrals:
fri =
λicP (p
′
ic > p
′
0ic)
λfiP (p
′
iw > p
′
0iw) + λicP (p
′
ic > p
′
0ic)
(37)
3.4 Wage determination
As already mentioned above, the union and the firm bargain over the wage ex-ante. The union
maximizes ((f − un)Wn + (1 − f − ui)Wi + unUn + uiUi − br ), which is the sum of the present
discounted values of both employed and unemployed natives and migrants. The outside option
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of the union is br because if negotiation is not successful, everyone remains unemployed. The
expression which the representative firm wants to maximize consists of four parts, because there
are two different groups of employed workers matched to the firms through two different channels.
The expression is the sum of the expected returns from the two groups of employed workers
matched to the firms through two different channels. Since frn fraction of the f − un employed
native workers are matched to the firm through referrals, the expected return from the native
workers who found job through referrals is (f−un)frn
∫∞
p′0nc
[Ep(J(p|p′nc))−V ]dΦnc(p′nc). 1−frn
fraction of the f −un employed native workers are matched to the firm through formal channels.
The expected return of a firm from a native worker who found job through formal channels is∫∞
p′0nw
[Ep(J(p|p′nw))−V ]dΦnw(p′nw). Thus the expected return of a firm from native workers who
found job through formal channels is (f − un)(1− frn)
∫∞
p′0nw
[Ep(J(p|p′nw))− V ]dΦnw(p′nw). fri
fraction of the 1 − f − ui employed migrant workers are matched to the firm through referrals,
so the expected return from the migrant workers who found job through referrals is (1 − f −
ui)fri
∫∞
p′0ic
[Ep(J(p|p′ic))− V ]dΦic(p′ic). Finally, 1− fri fraction of 1− f − ui employed migrant
workers found their job through formal channels, hence the expected return of a firm from migrant
workers who found job through formal channels is (1 − f − ui)(1 − fri)
∫∞
p′0iw
[Ep(J(p|p′iw)) −
V ]dΦiw(p
′
iw). The outside option for the firm is zero.(
(f − un)Wn + (1− f − ui)Wi + unUn + uiUi − b
r
)B
(
(f − un)frn
∫ ∞
p′0nc
[Ep(J(p|p′nc))− V ]dΦnc(p′nc)
+ (f − un)(1− frn)
∫ ∞
p′0nw
[Ep(J(p|p′nw))− V ]dΦnw(p′nw)
+ (1− f − ui)fri
∫ ∞
p′0ic
[Ep(J(p|p′ic))− V ]dΦic(p′ic)
+ (1− f − ui)(1− fri)
∫ ∞
p′0iw
[Ep(J(p|p′iw))− V ]dΦiw(p′iw)
)1−B
−→ max
w
(38)
Where B is the bargaining power of the union. This approach is an extension of the canonical
model of "Right-to-Manage" (see Cahuc et al. (2014), Part Two, Chapter 7, section 3.2.) The
model described above is used to numerically calculate some values of variables in the model and
find an explanation of the 7.26% difference in the probabilities of using referrals when finding a
job between the natives and migrants.
4 Numerical example
First, we discuss the choice of the values of the exogenous variables described in the Table 5.
The mean of the workers’ true productivity µ is normalized to 1. Stops (2016) and Dengler et
al. (2016) use as a dependent variable the natural logarithm of the number of matches in the
German labour market. The total factor productivity of the matching function is calculated
using the estimation results of Stops (2016), and the average of the calculated values is around
0.75. The average total factor productivity of the matching function is around 1.05 when using
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the estimation results of Dengler et al. (2016). The total factor productivity of the matching
function λ0 is chosen 0.9, which is the average of the calculated values. Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001) study the matching function and report that the empirical studies estimated the elasticity
parameter to be from 0.5 to 0.7 when the flow of hires is used as a dependent variable, stock
of unemployment and vacancies as explanatory variables. These studies assume Cobb-Douglas
form of the matching function. While there are studies which use as a dependent variable not
only the hires from unemployment, but the total hires and estimate η to be from 0.3 to 0.4. For
the total factor productivity of the matching function η value of 0.5 is chosen as the average of
the lower bound and the upper bound of the values estimated in the literature. As a fraction
of the native workers we use the definition described in the data part and find the fraction of
natives in the data. Unemployment benefit b is equal to 0.7, which is close to the average in the
literature. Shimer (2005) sets the value of unemployment benefit to 0.4. Stupnytska (2015) uses
the value of 0.5 for b. Hall and Milgrom (2008) get a larger value of 0.71, while Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) set b equal to 0.955 in their benchmark calibration. The values of the flow cost
of the vacancy, interest rate and job destruction rate are the values used by Stupnytska (2015).
Variable Value Explanation. Source.
µ 1 Mean of the workers’ true productivity. Normalization.
λ0 0.9 Total factor productivity of the matching function. Stops (2016),
Drengler et al. (2016).
η 0.5 Elasticity with respect to the unemployment in the matching function
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
f 0.8783 Fraction of the native workers. SOEP data from 2002 to 2008.
hn 90 Number of the contacts of native workers. Stupnytska (2015).
hi 50 Number of the contacts of migrant workers. Stupnytska (2015).
b 0.7 Unemployment benefit. Average in the literature.
σ2 0.1 Variance of the true productivity. Own calculations.
σ2 0.1 Variance of the error term. Own calculations.
c 0.5 Flow cost of the vacancy. Stupnytska (2015).
γn 0.8783 Level of homophily between the social contacts of a native worker
SOEP data from 2002 to 2008.
γi 0.7 Level of homophily between the social contacts of a migrant worker
Titzmann and Silbereisen (2009).
r 0.01 Interest rate. Stupnytska (2015).
δ 0.2 Job destruction rate. Stupnytska (2015).
Table 5: Values of the exogenous variables
Intuitively, one can expect that migrant workers have smaller social networks in the new
destination country. We assume that migrant workers have smaller number of the contacts than
natives. 90 and 50 are the numbers of the contacts of worker with high and low social capital in
the study by Stupnytska (2015). The variance of the true productivity and the variance of the
error term are chosen so that most of the observations have positive productivity. Titzmann and
Silbereisen (2009) study the friendship homophily among the emigrant adolescents from Soviet
union to Germany and find high levels of friendship homophily. Levels of friendship homophily
among the newcomers was 75% and 65% among experienced. For the level of homophily between
the social contacts of a migrant worker the average of these two is used. For the level of homophily
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between the social contacts of a native worker we use the fraction of natives assuming natives
form contacts randomly.
Variable Value Explanation
s 0.1852 Average productivity difference between the workers with and without a referral
d 0.2471 Average productivity difference between the native and migrant workers
a 0.0616 Vacancy arrival rate
v 1.4785 Vacancy rate
B 0.839 Bargaining power of the union
un/f 0.0736 Unemployment rate of native workers
ui/1− f 0.1364 Unemployment rate of migrant workers
frn 0.2753 Fraction of natives who found job through referrals
fri 0.3479 Fraction of migrants who found job through referrals
Table 6: Calibration results
The model is calibrated using the (23) and (24) steady state equations for the unemployment
rates of natives and migrants, Free Entry condition described in the equation (31), and the frac-
tions of migrant and native workers who found their job through referrals from the equations (37)
and (36). The unemployment rates of natives and migrants are calculated according to the ILO
guidelines from the SOEP data of the years 2002 to 2008. As a fraction of natives/migrants who
found job through referrals the predicted probabilities of the average native*/migrant* are used.
The fractions of natives and migrants who found job through referrals and the unemployment
rates of natives and migrants are plugged into the five above mentioned equations. The system
of the equations is numerically solved for s, d, a, v and B. The calibration results are presented
in the Table 6. Further, Table 7 shows some of the values of the endogenous variables.
Variable Value Explanation
λfn 4.3033 Job finding rate in the formal market for natives
λfi 8.4922 Job finding rate in the formal market for migrants
λnc 0.9389 Job finding rate through referrals for natives
λic 1.3784 Job finding rate through referrals for migrants
w 1.0430 Wage
qn 0.1882 Job filling rate in the formal market for natives
qi 0.0954 Job filling rate in the formal market for migrants
mn 0.0607 Number of matches through referrals for natives
mi 0.0229 Number of matches through referrals for migrants
Table 7: Values of the endogenous variables
Figure 1 shows the value of the objective function of the union and the firm at different values
of wage w during the bargaining process. The green line is the objective function of the union.
We can see that the objective function of the union reaches its maximum when wage equals to
1.084. The blue line is the objective function of the firm, which is decreasing in wage w.
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Figure 1: Objective functions of the union and the firm.
Figure 2 shows the value of the objective function at different values of wage w during the
bargaining process. We can see that the value of the objective function reaches its maximum
when the wage equals to 1.043. As expected, compared to the objective function of the union,
the overall objective function is maximized at a lower wage.
Figure 2: Objective function of the Nash bargaining process.
Figure 3 depicts the probability density functions and the lower bounds of the productivity
signals for the four groups. The blue dash line is the PDF of the productivity signal for the
native workers matched through referrals. The vertical blue dash line is the lower bound of the
productivity signal for the native workers matched through referrals. The surface area bounded
with these two blue dash lines is the probability that the native workers have productivity signal
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Figure 3: Probability density functions and the lower bounds of the productivity signals.
higher than the lower bound when matched with the firm through referrals.The blue line is the
PDF of the productivity signal for the native workers matched through formal channels. The
vertical blue line is the lower bound of the productivity signal for the native workers matched
through formal channels. The surface area bounded with these two blue lines is the probability
that the native workers have productivity signal higher than the lower bound when matched with
the firm through formal channels. Similarly, The green dash line is the PDF of the productivity
signal for the migrant workers matched through referrals. The vertical green dash line is the
lower bound of the productivity signal for the migrant workers matched through referrals. The
surface area bounded with these two green dash lines is the probability that the migrant workers
have productivity signal higher than the lower bound when matched with the firm through
referrals.The green line is the PDF of the productivity signal for the migrant workers matched
through formal channels. The vertical green line is the lower bound of the productivity signal
for the migrant workers matched through formal channels. The surface area bounded with these
two green lines is the probability that the migrant workers have productivity signal higher than
the lower bound when matched with the firm through formal channels. The corresponding
probabilities and the values of the lower bounds of the four groups are reported in the Table 8.
p′0nw P (p′nw > p′0nw) p′0nc P (p′nc > p′0nc) p′0iw P (p
′
iw > p
′
0iw) p
′
0ic P (p
′
ic > p
′
0ic)
1.0860 0.4237 0.9007 0.7377 1.3331 0.0972 1.1479 0.3195
Table 8: Values of lower bounds and probabilities to be hired after the match
Table 8 shows that the probability that the native workers are hired after they are matched
with the firm through referrals is 0.7377, which is approximately 1.74 times more than the
probability for the native workers matched through formal channels. The probability for the
native workers matched through formal channels is 0.4237. The probability that the migrant
workers are hired after they are matched with the firm through referrals is 0.3195, 3.29 times
more than the probability for the migrant workers matched through formal channels, which
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equals to 0.0972. So the gain from finding job through referrals for the natives is lower than
the gain for the migrants, which can be the reason of the 7.26% difference in the probabilities of
using referrals when finding a job between the natives and migrants.
5 Conclusions
Empirical analysis of the SOEP data from 2002 to 2008 show that 41.21% of migrant workers
found their current job through referrals. While 31.79% of native workers found their current
job through referrals. Estimation results of the panel probit model with random effects show
that a part of the 9.42% can be explained by the control variables including characteristics of the
individuals and firms. But still there is 7.26% statistically significant difference of the predicted
probabilities of using referrals between average migrant* and average native* workers. Intuitively,
one can expect that migrant workers have smaller social networks in the new destination country
and by that smaller probability of finding a job through referrals, but our empirical observation
shows that migrant workers are more likely to find a job through referrals even after introducing
controls. In order to explain this puzzle, this paper presents a search and matching model model
with heterogeneous worker groups and several search channels. Even though in the model native
workers have more social contacts than migrants, migrant workers are still more likely to find
job through referrals. Results from the calibration of the model show that as expected, average
productivity difference between the native and migrant workers is positive and equals to 0.2471.
Moreover, average productivity difference between the workers with and without referrals is also
positive and equals to 0.1852. In this setting, the firm does not observe the real productivity
of the worker, the firm observes the productivity signal of the worker, the group and matching
channel of the worker. The worker is hired if the expected productivity of the worker given the
productivity signal is higher than the lower bound of the productivity signal for the group of
the worker. The lower bounds of the groups are determined based on the ex-ante bargained
wage. Thus, given the distributions of the productivity signals for the four groups, we obtain
the probability of being hired after the match for the four groups.
The results presented in the Table 8 show that the probability that the native workers are
hired after they are matched with the firm through referrals is approximately 1.74 times more
than the probability for the native workers matched through formal channels. The probability
that the migrant workers are hired after they are matched with the firm through referrals is 3.29
times more than the probability for the migrant workers matched through formal channels. So
the gain from finding job through referrals for the migrants is higher than the gain for the natives.
In conclusion, we propose the following explanation to the reason of the different frequency of
finding job through referrals between natives and migrants. Migrant workers have low chances
of being hired therefore they gain more from being matched to a job vacancy through referrals.
Native workers have good chances of being hired even if they are matched through formal channels
therefore they gain less from referrals.
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